Education After Katrina: Time for a New Federal Response by unknown
Education after
Katrina
Southern Education Foundation
135 Auburn Avenue NE, 2nd Floor • Atlanta, GA 30303
www.southerneducation.org
SEF
S I N C E  1 8 6 7
TIME FOR A NEW FEDERAL RESPONSE
The Southern Education Foundation
The Southern Education Foundation (SEF), www.southerneducation.org, is a nonprofit organization comprised
of diverse women and men who work together to improve the quality of life for all of the South’s people
through better and more accessible education. SEF advances creative solutions to ensure fairness and excel-
lence in education for low-income students from preschool through higher education.
SEF develops and implements programs of its own design, serves as an intermediary for donors who want a
high-quality partner with whom to work on education issues in the South, and participates as a public charity 
in the world of philanthropy. SEF depends upon contributions from foundations, corporations and individuals 
to support its efforts.
SEF’S VISION
We seek a South and a nation with a skilled workforce that sustains an expanding economy, where civic life
embodies diversity and democratic values and practice, and where an excellent education system provides all
students with fair chances to develop their talents and contribute to the common good.We will be known for
our commitment to combating poverty and inequality through education.
SEF’S TIMELESS MISSION
SEF develops, promotes and implements policies, practices and creative solutions that ensure educational excel-
lence, fairness, and high levels of achievement among African Americans and other groups and communities
that have not yet reached the full measure of their potential. SEF began in 1867 as the Peabody Education Fund.
CREDITS
Education after Katrina:Time for a New Federal Response is one of a series of reports by SEF in which we under-
take research, disseminate information and work with policymakers to expand education and economic oppor-
tunities in the South. Other reports can be found at www.southerneducation.org.
SEF thanks all Mississippians and Louisianans who offered their time and talent leading to this report and who
continue to exhibit great determination and courage in efforts to restore and improve education for all children
in their states.
Steve Suitts, SEF program coordinator, is the author of the report and was responsible for its research and
analysis. Lauren Veasey, SEF associate program officer, assisted in developing research and charts and fact-
checking. Lynn Huntley, SEF’s President, edited the report. Mary Sommers of Typographic Solutions designed
and supervised the printing of the report.
Education after
Katrina
Southern Education Foundation
135 Auburn Avenue NE, 2nd Floor • Atlanta, GA 30303
www.southerneducation.org
SEF
S I N C E  1 8 6 7
TIME FOR A NEW FEDERAL RESPONSE
© 2007 Southern Education Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America, First Edition.
Portions of this work may be reproduced without permission, provided that acknowledgement is given to the Southern Education Foundation. Limited permission is also
granted for larger portions to be reproduced by nonprofit and public agencies and institutions only, solely for noncommercial purposes so long as acknowledgement to SEF 
as the source is prominently given. Reproduction or storage in any electronic form for any purpose, commercial or noncommercial, is prohibited without the express written
permission of the Southern Education Foundation.
Printed copies of Education after Katrina: Time for a New Federal Response are available for order on-line and from the Southern Education Foundation, 135 Auburn Avenue,
Second Floor, Atlanta, GA 30303-2503 for $15.00 each while supplies last. An electronic version is available without charge at www.southerneducation.org.
Preface
by Lynn Huntley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
K-12 Education  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Lost School Days: School Dropouts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Displaced Students in Schools: Needy and Underserved  . . . . . 8
Short-Term Academic Effects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A Lost Summer for Recovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
S I D E B A R  
More “Education after Katrina” on SEF Web Site  . . . . . . . . 11
Higher Education  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Child Care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The National Interest in Education  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
S I D E B A R  
Federal Inaction in Education Emergency:
Prince Edward County, Virginia, 1959  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Inadequate Federal Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Higher Education Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
K-12 Schools’ Damage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
K-12 Students’ Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
College Students’ Needs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Allocation of Federal Funds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
S I D E B A R  
Federal Funds for Displaced Students in St. Tammany  . . . . 24
Child Care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Conclusions and Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
It Is Not Over  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1
table of contents
EDUCATION AFTER KATRINA
2bombings or hurricanes – there is a need for urgent, high-
level, responsive federal leadership and action to supplement
local resources.
Education is too important to be left to happenstance and
the vagaries of resource-poor, crisis-driven, storm-decimated
states. Failing to provide young Gulf Coast students the edu-
cation needed to meet future workforce readiness require-
ments, participate knowledgeably in democratic processes or
live independently isn’t wise, just or necessary. As a matter of
fact, it is short-sighted, cruel and contrary to the public and
national interest.
What is urgently needed now is a full, well-executed strategy
through national public policy to ensure that the resources
are in place to provide a quality education for Gulf Coast
children, lest they be victimized twice – first by the storms
and second by indifference or incompetence. If the policy
and resource half steps that thus far characterize the federal
response to the Gulf Coast catastrophe are allowed to stand,
a tragic precedent will be set. Children of the Gulf Coast
won’t be “left behind”; they will be “kept behind” due to a
massive failure of national will and low priority attached to
education as an element of recovery. The subliminal message
will be that students, especially those from low-income fami-
lies, aren’t entitled to a quality education, even when it is
beyond the capacity of their home states to provide it due to
exigent circumstances.
SEF’s purpose in writing this report is not to apportion
blame, although there is plenty of blame to apportion.
Instead SEF’s purpose is to challenge Americans and govern-
ment, especially at the national level, to do now what is still
needed to provide adequate educational assistance and lead-
ership for the sake of Gulf Coast children. They have suffered
enough and deserve better.
SEF’s message is simple: It is not too late. This is America.
Lynn Huntley
President
The Southern Education Foundation
A L M O S T  T WO  Y E A R S after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
struck the Gulf Coast of America, thousands of people in 
the richest nation in the world remain displaced. Huge areas
of a premier port city called New Orleans still lie in rubble.
Countless families continue the struggle to reclaim normal
lives. Despair over loss of place and loved ones haunts many
every day.
Nowhere are the continuing effects of the storms more evi-
dent than in education. As this report documents, vulnerable
children affected by the storms and scattered to the seven
winds remain victims of the devastation wrought. Placed
haphazardly in poorly reconstituted schools in the region or
struggling with limited help in schools that were and are ill
prepared to receive them across the nation, the children of
the Gulf Coast are still suffering, still at risk and still in need 
of our help.
This report is rich with data and detail about the plight of
such children and the tattered systems of education on which
they are now relying to prepare them for life and work. It tells
a story of massive failure of “we the people” through our
national government to respond effectively and adequately to
the storms’ devastation. The report documents a piecemeal
process through which the federal government has responded
to the need of Gulf Coast children for a good education.
Though the data on which the report relies are not com-
plete, the picture of neglect that emerges is deeply troubling.
Economically frail states, such as Mississippi and Louisiana,
with uncertain futures and limited revenues cannot be rea-
sonably expected to primarily finance their own recovery.
Extending resources – human and financial – in circum-
stances such as these is a primary duty of the federal govern-
ment. When Americans are hard hit by disasters – be they 
preface
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“Is this America?”
– Fannie Lou Hamer
Higher Education
Two dozen public and private colleges and universities 
were closed by the hurricanes in the New Orleans area,
and another five closed along the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
A majority of the displaced college students who re-enrolled
quickly located to schools in Southern states.
Between 45,000 and 54,000 New Orleans students dropped
out of college for at least a semester. Low-income students
had great difficulty relocating to another school. Approxi-
mately 30,000 students – nearly 1 out of every 6 students 
in Louisiana’s public colleges and universities – dropped 
out during the entire 2005-2006 school year. Black college
students appear to have been affected disproportionately.
In the second year after Katrina, more than 26,000 college
students in Louisiana’s public colleges remained out of school
after Katrina.
By the start of the 2006-2007 school year, almost 9,000
students in Mississippi had dropped out or were unable to
enroll in college due to Hurricane Katrina. The decline in
Mississippi college enrollment was primarily among White
students, most of whom were probably low-income.
Child Care
In Louisiana, licensed child care centers lost more than
15,000 children after Katrina. By the summer of 2007, only
1,738 children – 27 percent of the number enrolled before
the hurricanes – were being served by licensed child care
centers in New Orleans, although in mid-2006 there were
over 7,800 children under five in the city. More than half the
city’s pre-Katrina centers are unlikely to reopen. The storm’s
effects on Mississippi child care were not as severe or as long-
lasting, although Harrison County (Biloxi-Gulfport) child care
remained below its pre-Katrina level in the summer of 2007.
National Interest
The national government has a long tradition of responding
to education emergencies. In the aftermath of the Civil War,
the federal Freedman’s Bureau constructed schools, recruited
teachers and provided educational supplies. In the 1930s, the
Roosevelt Administration responded to a wide range of edu-
cation needs after the stock market collapse. Measured as a 
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S I N C E  H U R R I C A N E S  K AT R I N A and Rita struck the
Gulf Coast in 2005, public and media attention has largely
focused on economic recovery and rebuilding. Too often the
need to create opportunities and structures for a quality
education has not been treated as a key element of full
recovery planning and strategy. In fact, not since the Great
Depression of the 1930s has the United States witnessed 
so many of its own students thrown out of school.
K-12 Education
In the two months following Katrina, as many as 138,000
students were not in school. Twenty thousand to 30,000 K-12
students did not attend school at all in the 2005-2006 school
year. In the following school year, 2006-2007, as many as
10,000 to 15,000 school-age children may have missed all 
or most days of school.
Schools in 49 states received displaced students after the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. In states where the majority of dis-
placed students re-entered school, there were often insuffi-
cient numbers of classrooms, supplies and school personnel
(including counselors and administrative staff). Schools failed
to serve displaced students’ needs due to a lack of funds.
After Katrina, schools with displaced students reported an
increase in disciplinary problems and a greater need for men-
tal health counseling. Displaced children had some especially
serious health problems that were not always addressed and
exhibited very poor academic performance on state tests,
especially in Texas.
After the 2005-2006 school year, most states and communi-
ties failed to set up intense summer programs to address 
the special needs of displaced and disengaged students.
By the 2006-2007 school year, most public schools on the
Mississippi coast had recovered their academic performance,
although some schools showed lingering problems. In New
Orleans, the average student was twice more likely to fail
state tests as was the average Louisiana student.
executive summary
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4obstacle was a lack of funds. The method of distributing fed-
eral funding was also skewed: the most distressed school
districts serving the largest numbers of neediest students 
did not get most of the federal funding.
There was no federal assistance available to an estimated
20,000 to 25,000 displaced college students who re-enrolled
for the 2005 fall term due to the hurricanes. There were 
no federal funds to re-engage as many as 30,000 K-12 stu-
dents who dropped out of school in the year of the hurri-
canes. There was very little federal support for more than
30,000 college students who dropped out of college for 
all of 2006 in the aftermath of the hurricane. These students
were the most disadvantaged – and probably still are. They
were bypassed by the federal government’s emergency
education assistance.
C H I L D  C A R E : The federal government has made virtually
no response to the large perils and deprivations young
children at child care centers endured during an emergency,
and the federal government has made no real contribution
to help restore child care to New Orleans.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
It Is Not Over
All told, the federal government has failed to help make the
people and the Gulf Coast region “whole.” It must work with
clarity and urgency to shore up the efforts of hard-working
education leaders on the ground – for the children’s sake:
• Conduct a comprehensive review of needs and take
appropriate action to assist Gulf Coast schools.
• Help Gulf Coast colleges in need of support for recovery.
• Develop a plan to assist dropout students at all levels.
• Mobilize health care professionals to help storm-affected
students and their parents.
The students are still there. They still need assistance and
opportunities to recover and succeed. It is not too late for
them. And it is not too late for the national government 
to redeem America’s ideals of caring and opportunity
regardless of race, income or geography. It is time for a 
new federal response.
percentage of the nation’s gross domestic product (national
wealth), the New Deal response would be tantamount today
to spending approximately $58.5 billion for emergency
education assistance.
Today, in light of what happened, the federal government 
has a clear mandate to assist adequately in the recovery of
education after Katrina.
Inadequate Federal Response
As of the start of the 2007-2008 school year, the federal
government has committed approximately $2.5 billion for
relief and recovery relating to education after Katrina.Yet,
the federal funds for education after Katrina constitute barely
2 percent of all federal funding committed to address the
disastrous aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. For every
$2.5 billion spent for other purposes over the last two years,
the federal government has found only $1 to spend for
Katrina-related education.
DA M AG E D  S C H O O L S : The estimated cost of hurricane-
related destruction in K-12 and higher education in both
states is approximately $6.2 billion, but the federal govern-
ment has provided only $1.2 billion for education for this
purpose. New Orleans colleges and universities suffered 
the lion’s share of the material losses in higher education 
but have received a comparatively smaller amount of federal
funding for damage recovery. In fact, foreign nations essen-
tially have matched federal funding for restoring higher
education in Louisiana.
K-12 schools along the Gulf Coast received considerably 
less assistance from the federal government than they have
needed. Some schools continue to require substantial fund-
ing. For instance, New Orleans had almost 50 public school
facilities damaged beyond repair, and the average school
building is 70 years old.
D I S P L AC E D  A N D  D RO P O U T  S T U D E N T S : Because
federal funds were inadequate, the states probably spent as
much as $163 million above and beyond allocated federal
funds on K-12 displaced students during 2005-2006. Still,
displaced students often had unmet needs and the primary 
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S I N C E  H U R R I C A N E S  K AT R I N A and Rita struck the
Gulf Coast in 2005, public resources and media attention
have largely focused on economic recovery and rebuilding.
Too often the need to create the opportunities and struc-
tures for quality education has not been treated as an essen-
tial key element for full recovery.
But education is key. The future of the region depends on
how well the education systems that prepare Gulf Coast
residents for work, parenthood, civic participation and inde-
pendent living function now and in the future. The Gulf Coast
region provides vital routes and ports for natural gas and 
oil production, international trade and agricultural exports.
The wetlands are a vital part of the national ecosystem. One
sixth of all imports into the nation come in through Gulf
Coast ports. Without improving education, the patterns of
entrenched poverty that characterized the Gulf Coast region
before the storms will be recycled to the detriment of all.
It is in the national interest to help people in the Gulf Coast
region of our great country gain the help needed to attain
better lives and futures through education. Not since the
Great Depression of the 1930s has the United States wit-
nessed so many of its own students thrown out of school
and so many schools and child centers destroyed and closed.
During the last two years, however, the most powerful
national government in the world has spent relatively small
amounts of time, money and effort in helping to set right the
lives of America’s hurricane-displaced students and the
schools they attend.
Only the federal government can provide the new resources
– human and financial – and leadership to make recovery
through improved education a reality for thousands of 
young people.
This report is not a condemnation of any individual, depart-
ment or institution. It is a call for action now at the federal
level to respond to the continuing negative effects of the
storms on education for thousands of young people and the
future of the region.
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• 130,000-135,000 students missed 5 weeks of school
• 50,000-57,000 students missed as much as 1/4 of the 
school year
• 20,000-30,000 students did not attend school in 2005-2006
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H U R R I C A N E S  K AT R I N A  A N D Rita affected Louisiana 
and Mississippi differently in education. In New Orleans, most
residents evacuated the city and many were unable to return
to homes or schools for weeks, months or years. On the
Mississippi coast, most residents returned to their communi-
ties in a matter of days or weeks. Damage to the K-12
educational infrastructure was at least four times greater in
Louisiana than in Mississippi.
Even before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans school
district was in crisis. It had the largest number of the state’s
lowest performing schools and debt of over $250 million.
On the other hand, almost all school districts on the Missis-
sippi coast had healthy budgets and test scores above the
state average. Half of Mississippi’s coastal schools were
ranked by the state as “exemplary” or “superior.”
Lost School Days: School Dropouts
From late August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina struck,
through late October, when Hurricane Rita did its damage,
as many as 118,000 students in Louisiana and 20,000 students
in Mississippi were not in school for most or all days. The
aftermath of the hurricanes kept thousands of students out
of school during the 2005-2006 school year. The approxi-
mate numbers were:
K-12 education
EDUCATION AFTER KATRINA
Katrina Damage Costs to Louisiana & Mississippi K-12 Systems of Education
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8to ensure that these children had a safe environment in which
to learn (see map below). They faced daunting problems.
In Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, the three states where 
the vast majority of displaced students re-entered school at
least temporarily, there were too often insufficient numbers
of classrooms, desks, chairs, books, supplies and school per-
sonnel (especially counselors and administrative staff).
A significant percentage of schools failed to add personnel 
to serve displaced students. For example, 22 percent of
Louisiana schools surveyed by the RAND Corporation in
2006 needed more remedial teachers after displaced stu-
dents began to arrive, but only 6 percent hired additional
teachers to provide remedial work. One in 4 schools needed
Dropout and truancy rates are estimated to have been high-
est among students in families living in Federal Emergency
Management Administration (FEMA) trailers, where “rapid-
response” surveys suggest as many as 20 to 25 percent of
the school-age children did not attend school regularly in
early 2006.
In the following school year, 2006-2007, it appears that as
many as 10,000 to 15,000 school-age children may have
missed all or most days of school – two years after Katrina.
Displaced Students in Schools:
Needy and Underserved
School officials and teachers in 49 states and the District of
Columbia received displaced students and worked tirelessly
WWW.SOUTHERNEDUCATION.ORG
Number of Displaced K-12 Students Received
Source: U.S. Department of Education; Ed Week
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additional tutors, but only 1 in 50 schools hired them. These
needs went unmet largely because of a lack of available funds.
Almost 2 in 5 schools in the RAND survey reported an
increase in disciplinary problems and an even higher percent-
age reported that displaced students were more likely to
need mental health counseling than other students. Also,
two surveys of displaced families living in FEMA housing in
2006 showed that many children had serious health prob-
lems. A Columbia University survey found that 40 percent 
of school-age children had chronic health problems. One 
in 5 had a need for specialized medical equipment or had
missed prescribed medication in recent months.
Short-Term Academic Effects
Understandably, many displaced students exhibited poor
academic performance. Five states – Texas,Tennessee,
Georgia, Louisiana and Alabama – reported displaced
students’ test scores as a separate, identifiable group. While 
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Lack of Funds Kept Schools from Hiring Needed Personnel
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Overall test scores from public schools on the Mississippi
coast, where all but 6,000 students had returned, were as
high as they were prior to the storms. It was a remarkable
feat. Along miles of devastation, with small trailers and tents
serving as both homes and classrooms, amid a very slow,
frustrating period of initial recovery, administrators, teachers
and students on the Mississippi jointly maintained an impres-
sive focus and dedication on learning that prevented dramatic
declines. At the same time, some schools in districts like 
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, showed academic problems after 
the hurricanes, especially among low-income and African
American students.
In New Orleans, where nearly 20,000 students had returned
by the 2006-2007 school year, test scores in mathematics
and English were extremely low. The average Louisiana stu-
dent was twice more likely to score at state standard on
these tests than was the average New Orleans student in 
the Recovery School District (RSD), where most returning
displaced students enrolled.
The size of the testing gaps in the five states for displaced
students during the 2005-2006 school year ranged from a
high of 28 percentage points to a low of 3 percentage points.
Outside Louisiana,Texas had the largest number of displaced
students and the biggest gaps in test scores. In reading, dis-
placed students scored a cumulative average of 21 percent-
age points behind other students. When aggregated by
school level, Tennessee test data seems to indicate that the
gaps between displaced students and original students grew
larger in the higher grades. On the Tennessee mathematics
test, displaced high school students scored on average 
18 percentage points below all other students.
Test scores varied widely on the local level. In Atlanta public
schools, a small number of displaced students did better than
most other groups of students; but in other school districts,
like Houston, the gaps between displaced students and all
other groups of students were profound. (Test scores were
not aggregated for displaced students for the 2006-2007
school year.)
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Gaps in Tests Scores for 
Displaced Students by State
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A Lost Summer for Recovery
In most places, there were no intense summer programs to
address the displaced students’ academic, social and psycho-
logical needs once the 2005-2006 school year ended. Barely
more than a dozen small summer programs with academic
content were operational in New Orleans in summer 2006,
although according to a special population survey, there were
at least 28,000 school-age children there at that time. There
were some intense summer programs in Houston and a few
other venues, but they were the exception to the rule.
EDUCATION AFTER KATRINA
Additional details, charts, analyses
and sources, including a research
report on “Education after Katrina,”
can be found on the SEF Web site:
www.southerneducation.org.
More
“Education
after Katrina”
on SEF 
Web Site
Decline in State Test Scores in Bay
Saint Louis/Waveland School District
Algebra Test Scores by Student Group and by Year
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A majority of displaced college students who re-enrolled in
2005 relocated to schools in Southern states. In all, 3 out 
of 4 students who were able to re-enroll in the fall of 2005
relocated to schools in only 10 states.
Louisiana
Approximately 60 to 70 percent of the estimated 76,000
students from New Orleans-area schools – somewhere
between 45,000 and 54,000 students – are estimated to
have dropped out of college for at least an entire semester.
Forty-seven percent of Tulane University students transferred
to another school without losing a semester. The students
least likely to transfer were from Delgado Community Col-
lege, New Orleans’ public two-year college: 13 percent of
these students transferred to another school in fall 2005.
T WO  D O Z E N  P U B L I C and private colleges and univer-
sities were closed by the hurricanes in the New Orleans
metropolitan area; and five were closed temporarily in Missis-
sippi counties bordering the Gulf Coast. Most sustained
substantial physical damage.
New Orleans colleges had enrolled almost 76,000 students
in the 2004-2005 school year, and affected Mississippi
schools, primarily two-year colleges, had an enrollment of
almost 15,000. The vast majority of these college students
were out of school for at least 6 weeks and many did not
return to college for much longer periods of time, if at all.
higher education
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A large portion of college students who dropped out of
college were African American: One out of every 5 African
American college students in Louisiana’s public colleges
dropped out.
In the second year after the storms, rates of college atten-
dance in Louisiana continued to decline: It is estimated that
more than 26,000 college students in its public colleges and
universities remained out of school. Forty three percent of
these students were African American, although overall,
African Americans constitute only 28 percent of the state’s
public college enrollment.
In New Orleans, both public and private colleges continued
to have reduced enrollments in the 2006-2007 school year.
Among the city’s 4 major private universities, none had an
enrollment that was 90 percent of pre-storm levels. Two his-
torically Black universities, Xavier University and Dillard Uni-
versity, had the largest reductions. Public college enrollment
also remained considerably lower. For example, Southern
University had only 63 percent of its pre-Katrina enrollment.
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Low-income students who were attending New Orleans-
area colleges had great difficulty relocating to other schools.
For example, before the storms, while 48 percent of the
college students in both public and private colleges in New
Orleans were low-income, only about 20 percent of students
who re-enrolled in a school outside of Louisiana and Texas 
in the fall of 2005 were low-income.
In Louisiana, approximately 30,000 students – nearly 1 out 
of every 6 students in Louisiana’s public colleges and univer-
sities – dropped out during the entire 2005-2006 school
year. When estimates of dropouts from private colleges are
included, probably as many as 35,000 students in Louisiana
suspended their college education for at least the entire
2005-2006 school year.
Black students in Louisiana appear to have been affected
disproportionately at all levels. The number of high school
students who took the ACT for college entry dropped by
one-sixth in 2006. African American students accounted 
for almost 60 percent of this decline.
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declined by more than 2,600 students. More than 1,000
students attending the University of Southern Mississippi
dropped out of school for a semester and the enrollment
dropped for the entire year by almost 500 students.
By the start of the 2006-2007 school year, college enrollment
on the Mississippi coast had begun to rebound. Still, based on
enrollment projections, almost 9,000 students in Mississippi
had dropped out or were unable to enroll in college due to
the storms. In Mississippi, unlike Louisiana, 76 percent of the
decline in student enrollment since 2005 has been among
White students. A majority of those who dropped out of
Mississippi colleges were probably from low-income families.
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Mississippi
The Mississippi coast has been one of the state’s fastest
growing areas, but it is home to a relatively small number of
colleges and universities. Coastal counties include a satellite
campus of the University of South Mississippi, one of the
state’s four-year public universities; four two-year community
colleges; and three small private schools. These are the
primary institutions damaged by the hurricanes.
Sixty to 70 miles from the coast, the main campus of the
University of Southern Mississippi in Hattiesburg and seven
other small college campuses, including public and private
two-year colleges, received lesser damage from high winds
and tornadoes spun off by the hurricanes. The storms also
did some damage to campuses like Tougaloo College, more
than 200 miles away from shore, and Alcorn State University.
Approximately 15,000 college students (almost all attending
two-year colleges) had their education disrupted for an
average of 3 or 4 weeks. Nearly 3,000 community college
students are believed to have dropped out of school for an
entire semester. Enrollment at Mississippi Gulf Coast College
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For example, as of May 2007, St. Bernard Parish had only 
2 licensed child care facilities, compared to 26 operating
before the hurricane, and there were only 66 children in
child care compared to 669 in July 2005. In New Orleans,
only one-third of the city’s licensed child care centers had
reopened and only 1,738 children – 27 percent of the
number enrolled before the hurricanes – were being served
by such facilities.
This slow growth is not due to the absence of small chil-
dren. A special census undertaken in mid-2006 estimated
that New Orleans had over 7,800 children under five and 
St. Bernard had close to 1,000.
The primary explanation for the slow regrowth of licensed
child care centers in these parishes is a lack of local capacity.
A Save the Children 2006 survey of damage to child care
centers found that more than half the centers (149) in New
Orleans were not only closed but unlikely to reopen due 
to extensive damage.
Mississippi
The storm’s effects on Mississippi child care were not as
severe or as long-lasting as they were in the New Orleans
area. The state temporarily lost 76 child care centers and had
a drop of around 6,290 children in licensed child care centers
in 14 south Mississippi counties, according to a survey by 
the Early Childhood Institute of Mississippi State University
undertaken three months after the storms. Most centers
have rebounded with enrollment close to pre-Katrina levels.
Harrison County (Biloxi-Gulfport) was one of the communi-
ties where child care was hit hardest: Child care centers and
the numbers of children they served declined by nearly half
shortly after the storms. By 2007, facilities in Harrison
County were still serving notably fewer children.
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I N  T H E  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5 school year, most three- and four-
year-old children in both Louisiana and Mississippi were 
in a child care center, nursery or preschool. The storms
changed everything.
Louisiana
In Louisiana, licensed child care centers monthly served
47,589 children prior to Hurricane Katrina. One in 5 of 
these children were in child care centers in the New Orleans
metropolitan area. By November 2005, there was a drop 
of more than 15,000 children in licensed child care. Since
then, there has been slow regrowth in the number of
children served.
child care
EDUCATION AFTER KATRINA
Percentage of Child Care Center 
Re-Openings Since Katrina
Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes
Orleans St. Bernard
Source:The Katrina Index, April 2007; Agenda for Children,
Louisiana Department of Social Services Bureau of Licensing.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
32%
8%
16
T H E  F E D E R A L  G OV E R N M E N T has a well-established
role in attempting to prevent or mitigate the effects of natu-
ral and man-made disasters on different segments of the
American public and industry. The national government acts
to honor the federal compact that binds the states and their
peoples together to ensure that vital national resources and
security are not compromised and to allay human suffering.
In so doing, the federal government recognizes in the name
of the American people a shared citizenship and national
values that make e pluribus unum.
The national government has a long tradition of responding
to education needs and emergencies in the aftermath of 
the devastation. For example, after the destruction of the
Civil War, the federal government’s Freedmen’s Bureau con-
structed schools, recruited teachers and provided educational
resources to aid local groups and governments in responding
to needs of newly freed slaves and their descendants.
In 1933, among other measures, the Roosevelt Administra-
tion put into place “emergency educational programs” to
assist when economic collapse prevented some local and
state governments from keeping children in school. The
national government made direct grants to rural districts
totaling $20 million; $22.5 million in long-term loans to 
urban districts for teacher salaries; and $213 million in 
grants and $85 million in loans for school reconstruction 
and repairs. In addition, the federal government established
emergency education classes that enrolled as many as 612,000
young and older adults and funded the creation of nearly
2,000 preschools and nurseries for over 60,000 children.
Adjusted for inflation, this federal commitment of $400
million in the 1930s for education would equal $5.6 billion
today. Measured as a percentage of the nation’s gross domes-
tic product (current national wealth), the New Deal federal
emergency assistance for education would be the equivalent
of $58.5 billion today.
the national interest
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Today, the federal role in public education is larger and more
dynamic than ever before. It encompasses a self-proclaimed
national responsibility to ensure equal education opportunity
for disadvantaged students, especially minority and low-
income students. In light of the extensive damage to students
and schools after Katrina, the federal government has had a
clear mandate to respond with ample assistance for relief
and recovery to meet all sorts of human needs, including
education. For the 2006-2007 school year, the federal gov-
ernment’s education budget was $52 billion.
While state and local governments are responsible primarily
for financing public education, the federal role is essential for
relief and recovery from disasters such as those wrought by
the Gulf Coast storms.
in education
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There also have been shameful moments in the past when the federal government failed to
respond adequately in the face of education emergencies. In 1959, five years after the U.S.
Supreme Court ordered the end of school segregation in Prince Edward County,Virginia, as a part
of the original case of Brown v. the Board of Education, the county closed all public schools
instead of ending school segregation. Local White citizens then established a private academy that
the Virginia Legislature later supported through a statewide scheme of publicly financed vouchers.
From 1959 to 1964, while federal court actions moved slowly back and forth and a Southern-led
Congress refused to act, Prince Edward County had no public schools: 1,400 White children attended
the private, state-supported schools and most of the 1,900 Black children (a few hundred relocated
to communities outside the state) received little or no formal education. U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy called Prince
Edward one of the few places on earth where children were denied an education.
The national tragedy finally came to an end in May 1964 when U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black ruled that Prince
Edward County public schools must reopen and that, if necessary, the federal district court had the power to order county
officials to levy local taxes to support the public schools. More than 40 years later, the State of Virginia established
scholarships for the more than 1,500 African Americans who had become the “lost children” of Prince Edward County, denied
five years of education due to the state and local government’s hostility and the national government’s inaction.
Federal
Inaction in
Education
Emergency:
Prince Edward
County,
Virginia, 1959
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AT  T H E  E N D of 2005, four months after Hurricane Kat-
rina, the U.S. Congress enacted and President George W.
Bush signed legislation providing $1.8 billion to restart public 
and private schools in hurricane-damaged states, primarily
Louisiana and Mississippi, and to compensate school districts
across the nation for receiving and educating students who
were displaced by the hurricanes.
In the summers of 2006 and 2007, Congress provided
supplemental appropriations totaling $110 million for
Katrina-related education needs. The most recent supple-
ment, in May 2007, included a $60 million appropriation to
assist higher education and to recruit and train new teachers.
Congress also committed approximately $4.3 billion 
for additional Katrina-related relief and approximately 
$103 billion for extending military operations in Iraq.
In addition, since August 2005, the president and the
secretary of education have authorized approximately 
$200 million in leftover funds from existing programs. The
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has
announced financial commitments, expenditures and loans
totaling nearly $275 million since late 2005 to directly aid
schools and school districts affected by the hurricanes, and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
rearranged the allocation of $150 million to help displaced
children in child care and Head Start centers.
inadequate federal
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federal funding for education relief and recovery have been
committed for restoring and rebuilding the education institu-
tions’ physical structures and property.
Higher Education Damage
New Orleans colleges and universities suffered the lion’s
share of the material losses in higher education but have
received a comparatively small amount of the federal funding
(see chart on following page).
In fact, as of the end of the first quarter of 2007, foreign
nations had supplied more funds for restoring higher educa-
tion in Louisiana than had the U.S. government. At that time,
foreign governments had donated, directly or through
intermediaries, approximately $131 million to rebuild and
restore Louisiana colleges and universities, while the federal
government had allocated $120 million.
In May 2007, Congress appropriated an additional $30
million to support restoration of higher education in
Louisiana and Mississippi. Assuming these funds are distrib-
uted in 2007 in equal amounts between the two states,
federal funding for restoring Louisiana colleges will reach
$135 million and, at that point, essentially match foreign aid.
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In total, as of the start of the 2007-2008 school year, the fed-
eral government had committed approximately $2.5 billion
for relief and recovery relating to education after Katrina.
While this amount for restoring education may appear large
in absolute terms, it is small in comparison. For example,
the federal monies for education constitute barely 2 percent
of all funding that the U.S. government has committed to
address all disaster relief and recovery after Katrina.
In addition, Katrina-related education funds made up less
than 2.5 percent of the U.S. Department of Education’s
expenditures over the last two years.
Put another way, the funding the federal government has
allocated for relief and recovery of education equals the
amount spent for 10 days of funding the Iraq War. Overall,
for every $2.5 billion spent for other purposes over the last
two years, the federal government has found $1 to spend 
for Katrina-related education.
Federal funding has been nowhere near the amount needed
to help schools in Louisiana and Mississippi restore damaged
school structures and replace equipment and supplies. The
most recent estimate of costs of hurricane-related destruc-
tion in K-12 and higher education in both states was approxi-
mately $6.2 billion. In contrast, only $1.2 billion of the total 
response
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K-12 Schools’ Damage
K-12 schools along the Gulf Coast received considerably 
less assistance from the federal government than they have
needed and requested. Some schools (primarily in New
Orleans, St. Bernard Parish and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi)
continue to need more substantial funding to address huge,
persisting challenges in restoring the school systems’ physical
plant and basic educational equipment.
New Orleans faces a profound problem with school facilities.
The city has opened almost 60 public schools the last two
years and it may need 30 additional school buildings during
the 2007-2008 school year. The need for adding schools 
will continue over several years as the student population
grows. Currently, half of the schools in operation need
substantial repairs. Almost 50 public school facilities were
damaged so badly that they may be beyond repair. The aver-
age New Orleans public school building is 70 years old.
In St. Bernard, southeast of New Orleans, all of the 17 public
schools serving 8,880 students in the parish were severely
damaged. Five schools were condemned and a few others
may not be capable of restoration. Sales tax receipts for 
the parish and its schools in 2006 were cut nearly in half.
The process of rebuilding has been extremely slow. Similarly,
in Hancock County, Mississippi, “ground zero” for the Katrina
hurricane, the reconstruction of schools in and around 
Bay St. Louis has been extremely slow due to a lack of ade-
quate funds.
More money is not the only obstacle that these and, to 
a lesser extent, other school districts face in continuing to
repair and build needed schooling, but it remains a primary
problem. The federal funds for restarting K-12 schools simply
has come up short of the schools’ needs and losses in both
states – especially in Louisiana.
Even where federal funds have begun to help meet the
states’ needs for rebuilding schools, if the process involved
FEMA, as often it has on the Mississippi coast, local school
officials have endured extensive delays and inconsistent
policies and practices. FEMA officials frequently have failed 
to treat the restoration of public schools as a top priority 
for public funds.
Regardless of the exact ranking or amounts at a specific
moment, it is clear that foreign assistance has been as impor-
tant as the federal government’s own funding for restoring
Louisiana higher education.
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displaced students’ schooling during the 2005-2006 school
year. Wherever displaced students landed after the storms,
federal funding was usually not enough to help schools ade-
quately address the students’ education-related needs.
There were no federal funds to locate, support or re-engage
as many as 30,000 K-12 students who dropped out of school
in the year of the hurricanes. This failure stems mainly from
two factors. First, the absence of a system of record exchange
effectively prevented educators from accurately understand-
ing what was happening to thousands of at-risk K-12 stu-
dents once they were dispersed by the storms. It was almost
impossible to keep up with students on an individual basis,
and the absence of a linked record system meant that no
one could determine the location of all individual students.
Second, without adequate funds, educators and others had
to focus almost exclusively on the displaced students who
arrived in need at their schoolhouse door each week or
month. In most school districts they were in no position 
to see, much less serve, students at all levels of education
whom the hurricanes had pushed out of school and who 
did not return.
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K-12 Students’ Needs
The federal “emergency impact” funds earmarked specifically
to assist K-12 students displaced by the hurricanes also have
been inadequate. Congress appropriated $880 million for 
K-12 displaced students and $10 million for low-income
displaced college students in December 2005.
On average the federal appropriation provided approximately
$5,600 to K-12 schools for each hurricane-displaced student
enrolled and an average of nearly $1,000 to colleges and
universities that enrolled low-income, displaced students.
Federal funds went to both private and public schools.
Federal funds did not cover the real costs that local school
districts outside Louisiana and Mississippi incurred to enroll
and educate displaced K-12 students during the 2005-2006
school year. Federal funding for K-12 displaced students was
below the average per pupil expenditures that most states
spend on all students.
Most displaced students remained in Louisiana and Mississippi,
but other states enrolled an estimated 50,000 to 85,000
students over the course of the year and spent as much as
$163 million above and beyond allocated federal funds for
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hot meals. School safety and student violence became a
widespread concern for students and parents. Every day
throughout the school year, new students arrived at school
buildings somewhere in the city seeking enrollment even
though many of the schools that were open still required
additional repairs.
The city’s total public school enrollment began near 
12,000 students. It more than doubled during the year.
At times, parents of “new” students could not find schools
that would admit them. At one point, there were waiting 
lists for enrolling over 100 students, but eventually more
schools were opened by RSD.
By the end of May 2007, there were 58 schools serving
approximately 26,000 formerly displaced students across
Orleans Parish. Approximately 72 percent were African
American and 86 percent were eligible for free or 
reduced lunch.
The academic problems of the returning displaced students
persisted: In both English and math, only one-forth to one-
third of the Orleans students in RSD schools scored at state
standards in the fourth and eighth grades, while more than
Only nine months after Hurricane Katrina, thousands 
of displaced students “disappeared” – too often literally.
As far as federal policy was concerned, displaced students 
no longer existed.
With the aid of private philanthropy and volunteers, some
schools and school districts in places like Houston,Texas,
set up summer programs for displaced students during the
mid-months of 2006. In New Orleans in June and July 2006,
school-age children were clustered on street corners, in
litter-filled lots and on porches throughout large sections of
the city. The special census reported at least 28,000 school-
age children were in the Orleans Parish during that summer,
while there were very few summer programs and even
fewer with educational content. It was a summer of missed
opportunities for catching up students on lost learning and
schooling. But there was no important federal involvement
or role in helping displaced students catch up and dropouts
to reconnect.
When schools opened across the Gulf Coast in 2006, federal
officials described how much the national government had
done in response to Katrina.Yet, by August, the federal gov-
ernment’s small role in addressing the problems of education
after Katrina had essentially ended. In the aftermath, in the
2006-2007 school year, the Gulf Coast schools were left
largely “on their own.”
New Orleans schools experienced special problems. The 
city had two school districts – the elected parish school
board and the Recovery School District (RSD) authorized 
by the legislature. The parish school board operated 5 regu-
lar schools and 12 charter schools, most of which had selec-
tive admission. The RSD operated 39 schools: 22 regular
schools and 17 chartered schools. None of the RSD schools
had selective admission. In addition, there were 2 other char-
ter schools in the city.
There were widespread problems from the first day of
school. Some schools were unable to supply classroom
teachers for several weeks. Some had difficulty keeping
teachers. Some schools were unable to provide edible meals
or functioning water fountains. Some had problems with
functioning bathroom facilities and only a few schools offered 
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College Students’ Needs
The federal government provided $10 million to colleges for
enrolling displaced students: an average of $1,003.21 for each
of the 9,968 displaced college students whose family incomes
were qualified as “low-income.” Federal funds went to both
private and public schools. As a result, the colleges and uni-
versities that took in low-income students are estimated to
have spent as much as $45 million of their own resources
educating these students during the fall semester of 2005.
There was no federal assistance available to the colleges and
universities where an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 additional
displaced college students (not eligible for federal aid or who
were not counted as eligible) enrolled for the 2005 fall term.
Some of these students were able to pay college costs at the
new institutions, but many others were not. As a result, both
public and private colleges issued a large number of waivers
for fees and costs. These institutions expended an estimated
$75 to $125 million of their own resources to support the
education of these displaced students in 2005. There were
also “stranded students” who were probably missed by the
available data on displaced college students.
The federal government’s decision to provide only $10 mil-
lion to respond to the emergency needs of over 80,000
college students – both those displaced from their schools
and those whose families were displaced from their homes 
– left a large number of low-income students without the
means to continue their education, especially after the fall
2005 semester. All told, public and private colleges across 
the nation provided somewhere between $120 million 
to $170 million in support of displaced students for their
higher education.
Allocation of Federal Funds
The federal legislation authorizing the bulk of monies to
states for reopening local schools appears on its face to 
treat all students and schools equitably, but in practice it
shortchanged some schools and school districts that suffered
the largest damage and dealt with the largest numbers of
displaced students.
The federal definition of a “displaced student” included
students who moved only within their own school district –
from one damaged school to another operating school in 
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half of all Louisiana students statewide in the same grades
met the standards. The selective-admission schools operated
by the parish school board helped to push its student scores
above the state average, but the scores of a majority of these
schools with some of New Orleans’“best and brightest” also
appeared to be disappointingly low.
With federal funds provided earlier, New Orleans schools
emerged in the 2006-2007 school year as the site of 
the nation’s foremost experiment with charter schools. In
September 2006, it had 69 percent of its students in charter
schools, the largest percentage of any major U.S. city. By 
the end of the school year, added enrollment in regular RSD
schools had reduced the number to 57 percent. By all indica-
tions, New Orleans will remain the nation’s premiere testing
grounds for how charter schools can serve the needs of
disadvantaged students.
Recent community surveys by the Boston Consulting Group
indicate that a large majority of parents and community lead-
ers support increased choice in the public schools and are
relatively optimistic about the long-term future of New
Orleans public schools. In the summer of 2007, the Recovery
School District hired Paul Vallas, former superintendent of
Philadelphia Public Schools, as its chief executive officer. Vallas
immediately announced plans for a large program of summer
schools in the city and established what he referred to as
“Tiger Teams” to address major, lingering operational issues 
in the RSD schools. He began work in July to face the imme-
diate challenge of opening as many as 20 additional schools
during the course of the 2007-2008 school year.
In surrounding New Orleans suburban parishes, there has
been continued steady progress toward repairing or building
new schools, although schools in rural St. Bernard remain
largely closed. Jefferson Parish has decided it needs to hire
additional school counselors to address some students’
lingering problems in the aftermath of Katrina.
On the Mississippi coast, school recovery has continued,
although trailers remain a staple in many school yards as
repairs and construction proceed. Perhaps the one exception
is Hancock County, where progress in school renovation
remains very slow.
EDUCATION AFTER KATRINA
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This method of distributing federal funding increased per
pupil revenue for all districts that had a substantial number 
of displaced students who remained within the local school
district, and it skewed the federal aid for assisting the most
distressed schools and students in public school districts in
both Louisiana and Mississippi. The funding formula helps 
to explain one of the reasons that suburban New Orleans
parishes and many school districts in Mississippi along the
Gulf Coast have been able to recover at a faster rate than
New Orleans schools.
No school district received a “windfall,” and the damages 
and suffering at all coastal school districts were real.
But some districts in the disaster areas have had a much
easier recovery, in part due to the way federal funds were
skewed. Federal education funds did not go as a matter of
priority to schools and students with the greatest needs 
and disadvantages.
the same district. As distributed, these federal impact funds
tended to help disproportionately the hurricane-affected
school districts within Louisiana and Mississippi that had less
damage and a smaller loss of students.
St. Tammany, the suburban parish of New Orleans across
Lake Pontchartrain, provides a revealing example. In effect,
St. Tammany public schools received $23.3 million in federal
impact aid to educate primarily its own students in numbers
slightly smaller than before the hurricane, while Baton Rouge
received only $3 million more than St. Tammany to educate
an influx of 4,000-5,000 new displaced students. Instead of
having to use federal funds to educate added, new students,
St. Tammany received what amounted to a federal supple-
ment of about $666 per child across the district to spend on
a slight decrease in the number of students in their 35,000
student population.
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Living on the opposite side of a huge man-made lake from the city of New Orleans, St.Tammany’s
residents suffered real, widespread losses from the ravages of Hurricane Katrina, but only 3 of its 
52 public schools were destroyed. All public schools had some damage, but the district did not have
extensive destruction on the magnitude of what visited New Orleans schools. According to an auditor’s
report, damage to St.Tammany’s school infrastructure was approximately $110 million, roughly one-tenth
the cost of school-related destruction in the Orleans public schools.
St.Tammany’s schools reopened in late September, less than a month after Katrina. A month later, in October 2005, the district 
had 32,500 students in school, 90 percent of its pre-Katrina enrollment. By Christmas, 95 percent of its students had returned to 
the district schools. Meanwhile, the district also did not receive a substantial number of students from other parishes. Instead,
St.Tammany educated students who were displaced from schools within its own district.
Because it had 3 destroyed schools that forced students to transfer elsewhere in the district, St.Tammany reported that it had
between 5,300 and 6,000 displaced students and received $23.3 million on the basis of the number of displaced students the 
district was educating. (The district also has received additional FEMA monies to rebuild schools.)
In other parts of Louisiana, school districts had to use the federal funds – and probably some of their own funds – to educate
additional numbers of displaced students who increased their school district’s total enrollment. For instance, East Baton Rouge schools
took in more than 5,000 new displaced students from other Louisiana districts by October 2005. (The number declined to almost
4,000 in December.) In turn, the Baton Rouge public schools received $26.4 million as of June 30, 2006, from the federal impact
appropriations to educate these children who were in a new location and a new school.
Federal Funds
for Displaced
Students in
St. Tammany
in absence of effective efforts for prevention and recovery,
these problems will escalate in the coming months and years.
Unless remarkable changes are implemented, the under-
achievement and low academic performance with which
New Orleans schools have struggled in the past will become
entrenched once again. In turn, the poverty, racial and
economic isolation from which so many suffered in the 
past will be re-created in the future.
Money is not the sole answer to the education problems of
the Gulf Coast, but having adequate resources is a precondi-
tion to creating a public system of education that will reverse
the downward cycle of poverty. Without adequate resources,
it is difficult to imagine that many low-income people from
the region will have a chance in the future for better lives
and livelihoods through education.
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Child Care
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services pro-
vided $90 million to serve 5,000 displaced children who 
had attended preschool and another $60 million in waivers
for child care centers. The federal government has made 
no contribution or impact to help restore child care to 
New Orleans. By way of contrast, the damage to Mississippi’s
child care sector was smaller than New Orleans’ and has
improved substantially through strategic uses of the limited
resources of private philanthropy.
Consequences
There will be grave, negative consequences emerging in the
next few years from the disaster that students and children
endured in the aftermath of Katrina. As a result of the lack 
of response and resources, especially in the New Orleans
area, the pressing problems of education, which troubled the
city even before the storms, may worsen.
Before Katrina, New Orleans’ high school graduation rates
were among the lowest in the nation due to high dropout
rates. The city’s students have experienced enormous forced
mobility and the professional research strongly suggests that,
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It Is Not Over
In an era when education has become one of the most
important factors in providing all children with opportunities
to become self-reliant adults capable of contributing to soci-
ety, the federal government virtually abandoned the most
disadvantaged students displaced by Katrina. There is now
mounting evidence that the hurricanes may have created 
a new lost generation of students in an area of the nation
that is already among its poorest.
The federal government has failed to help make the people
and the Gulf Coast region “whole.” It must work with clarity
and urgency to undo the consequences of past failings and
help shore up the efforts of hard-working education leaders
on the ground – for the children’s sake and for the sake of
our nation.
The national government needs to help meet the remaining
education challenges from the hurricanes:
• A comprehensive review of education needs is a matter 
of first priority in order to assess the work that must be
done to assist Gulf Coast schools to achieve at high levels
of excellence in the future. This assessment includes con-
sidering the needs of students, teachers and school officials,
as well as the school buildings where learning will take
place. New funds must be allocated to help meet the
continuing needs of displaced students and assist in rebuild-
ing schools that serve the students who are most in need.
The review also should assess the needs of displaced stu-
dents who remain in school districts outside of the Gulf
Coast region, and resources should be provided to schools
to assist these students where needed.
• Measures should be implemented to help Gulf Coast
universities and colleges that still need support for recon-
struction and recovery. There are both public and private
colleges and universities in New Orleans that have been
unable to restore their campuses and enrollments. In the
21st century, these institutions are as vital to our national
interest as the preservation of other private and public
sectors of our economy. These struggling institutions have 
a venerable history of educating low-income, disadvantaged
young people from Louisiana and across the United States.
conclusions &
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The American people and its government had not faced 
a challenge to its mission in education like the Katrina disaster
for almost 70 years. While the government’s response in the
last two years has not been adequate, there remains impor-
tant work that the federal government can do in helping
disadvantaged students and disabled schools recover and
succeed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
The students are still there. They still need assistance 
and opportunities to recover and succeed. It is not too 
late for them. And it is not too late for the national govern-
ment to redeem America’s ideals of caring and opportunity,
regardless of race, income or geography. It is time for a 
new federal response.
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The federal government can preserve these institutions of
higher education at little cost, especially when compared
with the cost of mass ignorance. Moreover, the costs are
small relative to past and recent federal allocation for
assisting private sectors of the American economy recover
from natural disasters.
• A plan to assist students at all levels who have dropped 
out of school in the aftermath of the storms should be
developed to reconnect and reclaim thousands of talented
young people before it is too late. The link between 
failing in school and dropping out is well known, as is the
link to the criminal justice system. It is in the national
interest to avoid increasing the nation’s numbers of incar-
cerated people by diverting them into the skill-building
education system.
• The need to mobilize health care professionals to help
storm-affected students and their parents is urgent.
Students must be healthy in order to learn. Also, anti-social
and dysfunctional behaviors caused by the storms’ trauma,
left untreated, will fester and become manifest in ways that
disserve the public interest.
Serious consideration should be given to the creation of 
a high-level, federal-state coordinating entity to oversee 
the development and implementation of the measures set
forth above. On a temporary basis, this body would help to
coordinate personnel, resources and knowledge. This body
would help to maintain education recovery as a visible fed-
eral priority in practice and policy, to make federal assistance
more effective, and to assure that the federal government’s
role is responsive.
The crisis in education caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
is not over. Nor is it too late to renew and adjust the federal
role in order to make a real difference in the lives of thou-
sands of young people who are still deeply affected by the
hurricanes. This role is vital. It is a role and responsibility that
the national government must continue to share, until the job
of education recovery is done.
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